The Christmas Tsunami and public support in the Netherlands by Valk, H. & Schulpen, L.W.M.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/56079
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
 54 THE NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
The Christmas tsunami and public 
support for development cooperation 
in the Netherlands 
 
 
Han Valk and Lau Schulpen 
 
 
 
 
On Boxing Day 2004, a seaquake in the coastal waters of Indonesia led to a series of 
tidal waves (tsunami) which flooded a dozen countries over two continents. While 
adding a new word to the vocabulary of many people, the tsunami was one of the 
most devastating natural disasters in recent history. Almost a quarter of a million peo-
ple lost their lives and the survival of millions more was threatened due to the loss of 
agricultural land, the devastation of health and educational facilities and the loss of 
their loved ones. 
 A second tsunami soon occurred, but this one brought compassion and money. 
Governments all over the world promised billions in emergency and rehabilitation 
assistance, international organisations joined hands, with the UN as the overall coor-
dinating agency. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) had little difficulty in rais-
ing money for the tsunami victims. In the Netherlands the Cooperative Aid Organisa-
tions (SHO)1 received a total of around €205 million from the Dutch public within 
two months.2 That was four times the amount raised during the most successful disas-
ter campaign up to then (see table 1). However, public support in the Netherlands (as 
elsewhere) went a lot further than giving money to the traditional aid organisations. 
 
Table 1 The top 10 SHO campaigns 
 
 Campaign Period Revenue (x 1000 euro) 
1 Earthquake Asia (tsunami) 26-12-2004  > 205,000 
2 Refugees Kosovo 01-04-1999 / 31-03-2000 51,915 
3 Central America 12-11-1998 / 31-03-1999 37,220 
4 Rwanda 14-05-1994 / 31-12-1994 35,867 
5 Earthquake Turkey 19-08-1999 / 31-03-2000 30,484 
6 Africa Now 20-11-1987 / 14-08-1988 23,474 
7 Darfur (Sudan) 01-07-2004 / 24-12-2004 19,975 
8 Campaign for Africa 14-06-1992 / 31-12-1992 18,486 
9 Africa dies of hunger 06-12-1990 / 21-05-1991 17,398 
10 Hunger in Southern Africa 30-07-2002 / 28-11-2003 12,635 
 
Source: CBF 2004, Valk 2005. 
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Besides numerous activities by individuals and groups aimed at raising funds for the 
SHO, many started their own initiatives to help the tsunami victims. There were peo-
ple who, with or without a sum of money, travelled to the region to assist in person, 
while others set up their own small and informal projects and/or organisations. The 
latter seem to have been successful in raising substantial amounts of money from the 
public, as well as in providing a chance to express the need for support in a non-
financial way by becoming volunteers. The tsunami relief activities became a new na-
tional hype particularly in the first two months following the disaster. 
 Naturally, the record funds raised by the SHO and the fact that a lot of citizens had 
started their own initiatives or had joined those of others led to lengthy discussions. A 
number of explanations for the responses were soon provided (although not always 
substantiated by any major research), ranging from the fact that the tsunami had hap-
pened on Boxing Day (making it a kind of Christian duty to assist) to the idea that 
Europeans were also affected by the disaster, and from the fact that it was a natural 
disaster (so the people affected were ‘true’ victims) to the idea that it created a feeling 
of unity among the Dutch population after a period of political turmoil (e.g., the assas-
sinations of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh). Simultaneously, it also raised questions 
relating to public support for international development in the future. Was the sup-
port provided by the Dutch public (whether in cash, goods and/or time) a kind of 
breakthrough in the sense that, from now on, there would be more public involve-
ment in the broad field of international development? Or was the response to the tsu-
nami in the Netherlands just that the result of hype? Questions like these became even 
more important in light of the strong emphasis on public support within official Dutch 
development cooperation.3 
 
 
Public support in the Netherlands 
 
The term public support [draagvlak in Dutch] is commonly used in development co-
operation circles. It is one of the key elements of the new cofinancing system (MFS) of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is to start in 2007. NGOs that apply for funding 
need to show their level of support within Dutch society. In the words of the MFS pol-
icy, they need to show their embeddedness or anchoring. In practice this boils down 
to the need for organisations to show that they work with Dutch volunteers, receive 
part of their income from the Dutch general public and/or are cooperating with other 
Dutch organisations. More important perhaps is the fact that these NGOs can ‘only’ 
receive a maximum of 75 per cent of their total income directly or indirectly from the 
Dutch government. The other 25 per cent therefore has to be acquired elsewhere, for 
instance from the general public. This makes the 25 per cent rule an indicator of pub-
lic support for the organisation (DGIS 2005). 
 The fact that public support is commonly used does not mean that there is a clear 
and coherent idea of what it means. As seen above, the MFS talks about the amount of 
financial support or the number of volunteers an organisation has as indicators of pub-
lic support. As far as the National Commission for International Cooperation and Sus-
tainable Development (NCDO) is concerned, this view is too narrow-minded and it 
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therefore includes the opinions and the knowledge people have of international coop-
eration. 
 In combining such notions as knowledge, opinions and actions (e.g., voluntary 
work), Develtere (2003) sees public support as a multi-dimensional concept: partly to 
do with the level of knowledge, partly the level of opinion (attitude) and partly the 
level of behaviour. As these three dimensions are not causally related it is by no means 
easy to measure the extent of public support. This is further complicated by the fact 
that it continues to be unclear how much (and what kind of) knowledge, what kind of 
opinion and what kind of behaviour or action is needed. 
 In recent years, a number of studies have tried to measure the three dimensions of 
public support. Anker Solutions (2004: 12), for example, tried to specify the extent to 
which people are open to knowledge (information) on development cooperation and 
showed that 44 per cent of the respondents occasionally read about development co-
operation, while 10 per cent claim to read almost everything. Overall this means that 
almost three out of four respondents try to stay informed of development issues, at 
least to some extent. 
 The same study also showed that 66 per cent of the respondents were in favour of 
policy changes in development cooperation, whereas only 26 per cent thought that the 
current policy is the right one (ibid: 3). These figures seem to suggest that Dutch peo-
ple are generally unhappy with the way development funds are spent. Surprisingly, 60 
per cent think that the money for development cooperation is well spent and 74 per 
cent state that the budget for development cooperation in the Netherlands should at 
least remain at the same level. The conclusion then is that, despite a certain degree of 
scepticism, Dutch public support for development cooperation is generally strong. 
 However, public support in the sense of knowledge and opinion does not auto-
matically mean visibility in behaviour. Several studies show that although the majority 
of Dutch citizens regard development cooperation as important, only a relatively small 
percentage also believe they have an active role to play in this field. This third dimen-
sion of public support can be seen as philanthropic behaviour. Philanthropy is defined 
as the voluntary contribution of goods, time and/or money to charity (Schuyt 2005). 
To many development organisations this behavioural dimension is the most important 
one, particularly in light of the fact that, from 2009 onwards, they will need to fund 
25 per cent of the total budget from sources other than the ministry. 
 Although no data is available with regard to contributions in goods (and most offi-
cial development organisations are hardly interested in this type of support), it is likely 
that contributions in the form of goods are quite substantial in the case of private ini-
tiatives in the field of development cooperation. Stories about truckloads of goods be-
ing shipped to the tsunami-affected countries are a clear indication. According to 
Schuyt (2005: 81), slightly more than 41 per cent of Dutch citizens work voluntarily 
for at least one civil society organisation. Most volunteers are active in the field of 
sports, religious activities and health. Development cooperation (taken together here 
with human rights and refugees) attracts 1.9 per cent of Dutch citizens as volunteers, 
notwithstanding the fact that private initiatives within this field have boomed in recent 
years (e.g., Beerends & Broere 2004: chapter 13 and Context 2005). In terms of 
money, the Dutch public is said to be generous, with a total of €2.2 billion donated to 
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charity by the general public in 2003 (individuals, legacies, funds, companies and 
charity lotteries). However, international aid organisations only receive some 9 per 
cent (€483 million) of these donations (Schuyt 2005: 12).4 
 All in all, public support in the Netherlands for development cooperation is high if 
one looks at the knowledge and opinion dimensions. With regard to active public 
support, the overall picture is less positive since relatively few people become devel-
opment cooperation volunteers and financial contributions are a relatively small part 
of total contributions. 
 
 
Cooperating aid organisations 
 
Within hours of the waves hitting the Asian coasts, the SHO had opened its special 
bank account for the tsunami victims. The SHO received tremendous support when 
setting up its fundraising campaign. Different media organisations offered free adver-
tising space, paid all the expenses for a live television show and started to raise funds 
themselves for the SHO. Other NGOs decided not to raise money on their own ac-
count, but donated the funds they received through their own campaigns directly to 
SHO. The Dutch government contributed €5 million. 
 The SHO seems to have been successful in communicating the seriousness of the 
disaster to the media and the Dutch public. Over 50 per cent of the respondents in 
research carried out by Valk (2005: 88) thought that the tsunami was the world’s big-
gest disaster in the last fifty years. The SHO, which was already relatively well-known 
because of earlier fundraising campaigns, was ‘all over the place’ and received most of 
the donated funds. It was even said that at one point in time the bank account number 
of the SHO (giro555) was a stronger trademark in the Netherlands than Coca Cola. 
 About one out of every two households in the Netherlands contributed directly to 
the SHO. This was substantially higher than in earlier campaigns. The difference was 
due to contributions from households that normally do not contribute to development 
organisations at all. In a survey conducted by the department of philanthropy of the 
University of Amsterdam (Meijer et al. 2005), 40 per cent of the ‘givers’ were what 
they called ‘new givers’ (i.e., those that do not normally give money to charities). In 
our own survey the number of ‘new givers’ was 28.8 per cent, which is lower but still 
substantial (Valk 2005: 84). 
 Average contributions per household (€50) were also high. They represent ap-
proximately 20 per cent of a regular annual household budget for aid organisations 
(Valk 2005: 84). As mentioned above, the SHO received more than €200 million for 
its tsunami campaign, or four times more than the most successful fundraising initia-
tive in their history. This ‘sudden’ generosity does not seem to be due to a feeling of 
trust in the way the SHO spends its money. On the contrary, only one out of every 
three respondents thinks the SHO will spend their money in a proper way. This lack 
of trust is based on the public’s feeling about the way the SHO operated in the past. 
Just 30 per cent think that the money the SHO raised in the past was spent right (Valk 
2005: 87). 
 This lack of trust can be explained, at least in part, by the way the SHO communi-
cates with the public. Although they were successful in expressing the seriousness of 
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the disaster, they were less successful in communicating with the public afterwards. In 
general, this communication is of an impersonal character. The national scale of opera-
tion of the SHO makes more personal communication extremely difficult at the very 
least and perhaps even impossible. Besides, the fact that the SHO is basically an um-
brella name under which aid organisations raise funds together (i.e., it is not an or-
ganisation itself and has no staff of its own) makes communication difficult and per-
sonal communication practically impossible. Finally, communication is hampered by 
the fact that all the member organisations of the SHO work through their own local 
partners and many of the projects are (also due to the specific circumstances in the 
countries involved) complex. 
 All this does not mean that, once it became aware of the success of the tsunami 
campaign, the SHO did not try to improve its communication. Their website, for ex-
ample, includes comprehensive news items on the SHO and they also send their sup-
porters a three-monthly report detailing their activities and expenditure. In December 
2005, one year after the tsunami, the SHO even published a free nationally distributed 
paper explaining not only what had been done up to now but also the plans for 2006. 
 All in all, the SHO tried to establish closer links with existing and potential sup-
porters in the Netherlands. In doing so, it made mistakes, some of which had been 
made before. The free national paper mentioned above, for example, only included 
information about the successful project. By (again) only mentioning what had gone 
well, the impression was created that everything goes well. Put differently: this way of 
communicating seems to be based on the idea that the public only wants to hear posi-
tive news and/or is not capable of understanding that emergency aid (or development 
aid in general for that matter) can run into major problems. Such success stories can 
quite easily become a burden and lead to a negative public attitude, particularly when 
the media are on the lookout for things that go wrong. A recent report on public sup-
port shows that people think that organisations can no longer get away with ‘one-
sided reports on success stories’. This one-sidedness has not enhanced their credibil-
ity. Mistakes and failures also need to be mentioned, not to be punished but as input 
for learning, for showing that the organisations indeed learns and in order to empha-
sise that the reality of development cooperation is a complex one in which sustainable 
successes are achieved on the basis of trial and error (Commissie Draagvlak en Effec-
tiviteit Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 2006: 19). 
 The role the media have played in previous SHO fundraising campaigns illustrates 
that public opinion can easily be turned from positive into negative. The Kosovo fund-
raising initiative was the most successful fundraising event before the tsunami and 
here too the media was instrumental in making people aware of the seriousness of the 
situation and the need to donate. The official communication on the part of the or-
ganisations in the SHO was likewise restricted to positive stories. Six years later, a 
Dutch national paper reported that many things had, in fact, gone wrong (Dohmen 
2005). Money had disappeared or had been confiscated by the local mafia and projects 
had failed. The low trust of the Dutch public in the SHO was thus confirmed, even six 
years after the actual campaign. 
 By repeating the good news reporting in the case of the tsunami, the SHO became 
vulnerable to bad media publicly. A television show (TrosRadar) was the first to show 
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that not everything went as smoothly as the SHO wanted the Dutch public to believe. 
TrosRadar checked information, which had been provided by the SHO itself, in the 
field. There they found that some of the projects that were supposed to have been fin-
ished had never actually existed and that some projects SHO organisations had 
claimed as their own were in fact projects run by other organisations. No matter 
whether the claims were true or false, such media coverage only dented the already 
relatively low trust the general public and, particularly, new givers had in the organisa-
tion. Communication and the media, therefore, affected public support in the begin-
ning of the campaign and led to a lack of trust later. 
 
 
Media 
 
The media normally play the role of communicating opinions between the public, 
NGOs and the government. All the actors try to express their opinion in the media 
and influence other actors. The media themselves then play a mainly indirect role and 
one which is passive when compared with other actors. Indirect and passive does not, 
however, mean insignificant. Seventy per cent of the Dutch public regard television 
and radio as the main sources of information about development cooperation, with 19 
per cent attributing this role to newspapers and magazines (Anker Solutions 2004: 
11). The media are, therefore, the main source of information about development co-
operation and seem to play a decisive role when it comes to knowledge acquisition 
and opinions (and perhaps action). In the case of the tsunami, the media fulfilled a 
traditional role but combined that with a more active role in some cases. 
 The media therefore informed the public in a traditional way by providing news 
about the disaster and the opinions of victims, NGOs, governments, the Dutch public 
and so on. The demand for news from the general public perhaps surprised even those 
involved in the media. After all, the tsunami was front page news for over two weeks. 
This made it possible, but also necessary, for the media to adopt different roles. 
 In some cases, certain sections of the media became more active. Different media 
openly expressed sympathy for private initiatives and the SHO. They even sometimes 
made an appeal to their public to become active as well by donating money, goods or 
time (by becoming a volunteer). In a way, these forms of media lost – at least to some 
extent – their independent position and perhaps their objectivity. By supporting these 
actions openly they no longer merely communicated opinions, but gave opinions 
themselves. 
 Essentially the same occurred in the case of the live fundraising show on behalf of 
the SHO which was broadcast in January 2005. Although these kinds of shows had 
happened before, the scale was quite new. For the first time, commercial and public 
broadcasting channels joined forces in a three-hour live show. A similar show was 
broadcast on Dutch national radio, by both commercial and public stations. This en-
sured that a large majority of the Dutch public received the message and request to 
donate to the tsunami victims. 
 In a few cases the media were responsible for taking the last step in embracing ini-
tiatives that were intended to help these victims. They did not ‘just’ support the initia-
tive or ‘just’ raise money for them, but became the initiative themselves by trying to 
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help in the tsunami areas. For example, a national newspaper started by offering ver-
bal support to a small private initiative. As a result, the organisation behind this initia-
tive grew spectacularly and even to such an extent that the original initiators were no 
longer able to handle the organisation. The newspaper then stepped in to help out and 
to ensure that the money received from its readers was used in a proper way. Due to 
the amount of money raised, the intentions of the organisation were expanded from 
helping one family to helping a village. Readers were asked whether they wanted to go 
to the village and help directly as a volunteer. This call resulted in over 1,200 applica-
tions. All in all, by getting themselves involved the newspaper not only turned into an 
opinion-maker but even into a direct aid provider. This made it vulnerable to the same 
kind of negative coverage mentioned above. 
 
 
Public support 
 
Due to the massive media coverage, the tsunami was an almost ever-present news item 
in the Netherlands. At the same time, this coverage is likely to have contributed sig-
nificantly to the Dutch public’s general knowledge of the disaster. The CIDIN survey 
showed that 60 per cent of the respondents knew exactly when the tsunami disaster 
took place, while another 20 per cent named a date within two days of Boxing Day. 
An overwhelming majority of respondents (93.6 per cent) knew for certain that Indo-
nesia was one of the countries hit by the tsunami. A lot of people knew that Sri Lanka 
and Thailand were also affected (83.5 per cent and 92.1 per cent respectively). Al-
though only a few people were able to mention another tsunami-affected country (let 
alone African countries), most people had some basic knowledge of the disaster (Valk 
2005: 46). 
 People’s views of development cooperation in general and on the aid given to help 
the tsunami victims in particular were measured to give an impression of the second 
dimension of public support, namely attitude or opinion. On average, Dutch people 
are satisfied with how aid organisations spend their money and with the total amount 
of money spent. Despite this positive view of Dutch aid, people have little knowledge 
about exactly how the aid funds are being spent. Few people indicated that they knew 
for what and in which manner the funds are being used. 
 This lack of knowledge seems to add to an overall negative feeling on the use of the 
tsunami funds. Although many are convinced that the development organisations try 
hard to spend the money in a good way, few believe they are doing so effectively. Only 
33.9 per cent of the people that supported the SHO think the funds are going to be 
spent in such a way that it will help those who most need it. A survey by Onze Wereld 
Magazine (Ars 2006: 29) came up with similar figures: 37 per cent of the Dutch popu-
lation and only 24 per cent of the readers of the magazine think the tsunami money is 
spent well. 
 About two out of three respondents gave money to the cooperating aid organisa-
tions. As already mentioned, some of them can be regarded as new donors whereas 50 
per cent had given money to a national SHO fundraising campaign on at least one 
previous occasion (Valk 2005: 50). The SHO was, however, certainly not the only or-
ganisation to receive substantial financial support from the public. There were plenty 
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of private initiatives and, apart from attracting goods and volunteers, these were also 
successful in raising money. 
 
 
Private initiatives 
 
Despite all the funds raised, only 25 per cent of the Dutch public feel that they were 
actively involved in helping the tsunami victims. This indicates that many do not re-
gard donating money as an active expression of public support. The most active way 
of expressing such support is to start a private initiative. Although there is no reliable 
data on how many of these private development initiatives exist in the Netherlands, 
estimates run from 6,500 (Brok & Bouzoubaa 2005) to over 10,000 (Van Voorst 
2005).5 Equally, there is no clear data to show that the number of private initiatives 
has substantially increased in recent years, although many are convinced that this is 
the case. Beerends & Broere (2004: 175) conclude that these initiatives have increased 
in number significantly since the 1990s while Context (2006: 10) detected manifesta-
tions of such an increase in the substantial growth of ‘easily accessible subsidy win-
dows’. 
 Neither is there any data showing how many people started an initiative after the 
tsunami. Nevertheless, the impression is that many of these private initiatives were 
started after the disaster and it is quite clear that they gained a lot of media attention. 
The tsunami disaster certainly helped to make these private initiatives more visible to 
the Dutch public. In more concrete terms, they also became popular because they 
were presented as working faster, more effectively and more efficiently than traditional 
organisations and the government. 
 Overall, the growth of private initiatives is due to globalisation, to the fact that 
people travel to destinations further away and therefore come into contact more with 
poverty, to the process of individualisation in our own society and (perhaps more spe-
cifically to Dutch society) to decompartmentalisation (ontzuiling) (e.g., Beerends & 
Broere 2004: 175). As indicated above, the fact that several subsidy schemes for such 
private initiatives have also been initiated in recent years and the ‘lack of trust’ in tradi-
tional development organisations might have contributed to the phenomenon. A sur-
vey of post-tsunami private initiatives revealed that they were based on three main 
motivations: (1) a personal connection with the region or a country in the tsunami-
stricken area; (2) the feeling that traditional development organisations are not able to 
assist the tsunami victims (or at least not in an effective manner); and (3) the idea that 
something had to be done immediately. The latter is then connected to the second as 
the traditional development organisations are also often viewed as inefficient and slow. 
These motivations are comparable to those which formed the basis for starting other, 
non-tsunami related, private initiatives (also see Brok & Bouzoubaa 2005). All in all, 
there are few reasons to expect more sustainable general public support because of the 
tsunami. 
 The fast way of working with which these private initiatives are identified seems, in 
particular, to contribute to the fact that 70 per cent of the respondents feel that these 
initiatives are necessary in a period of emergency aid. Besides, they carry with them an 
aura of effectiveness with two out of three respondents believing that private initiatives 
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are successful in reaching the people who need the aid most and only 6.8 per cent 
thinking that their results in the tsunami areas will not be positive in the long term. 
 One of the main reasons for the high level of public trust in these initiatives is their 
method of communication. Communication with – potential – supporters often takes 
place in a direct and personal manner using the Internet as a preferred medium. This 
makes it possible to update the public on steps taken and progress made while using 
photos and videos for easy reference. Although such communication created a feeling 
of openness it also led to involvement and trust in the organisation. From the point of 
view of more sustainable public support this is important as it might mean that people 
will also be willing to support development cooperation through these private initia-
tives in the future. 
 Besides, these private initiatives are popular for the way they accept different types 
of support. Whereas traditional development organisations seem to be geared mainly 
towards financial support, the private initiatives also welcome contributions in goods 
and rely much more on volunteers. This makes these initiatives a suitable alternative 
for those wanting to contribute in a more active way then by giving money. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The general rule that it is extremely difficult to predict the future is certainly also ap-
plicable to public support for development cooperation. Still, there are few signs that 
the almost nationwide support after the tsunami in the Netherlands will have a bearing 
on the future. Few people have indicated that they are willing to spend (more) money 
or time on development cooperation in the future, even though they contributed gen-
erously after the disaster in December 2004. The lack of trust in official development 
organisations, with only one-third of people expecting the funds to be used effectively, 
seems to be an important reason for this. Despite more transparent communication by 
the SHO, the official organisations have not managed to bring about a change in atti-
tude among the general public. Therefore, there are few signs that the tsunami has 
triggered a more sustainable public support. 
 Perhaps an exception should be made here for private initiatives. The tsunami 
caused a greater awareness of these initiatives among the general public and they now 
seem to offer an alternative to the official agencies. For example, in contrast to these 
agencies, private initiatives offer the possibility of more active involvement (e.g., vol-
unteer work) as well as an opportunity to donate goods. Besides, public trust in these 
initiatives seems to be high largely due to the more open, transparent and easily acces-
sible communication, in which context the media played an important role not only in 
critically reviewing the work of the official agencies but also in supporting (sometimes 
very directly) the work of the private initiatives. This once again highlights the central 
role (and therefore responsibility) of the media and its importance for public support 
for development cooperation, now and in the future. 
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Notes
 
1 The Cooperative Aid Organisations (Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties (SHO)) is a coalition of 
nine aid organisations whose principal aim is to raise money jointly whenever there is a major 
disaster. 
2 According to TEC (2006: 16) ‘a massive media fuelled, global response resulted, producing an 
estimated US$ 13.5 billion in international aid’.  
3 This article is largely based on the MA research carried out by Han Valk (2005). 
4 The largest recipients of public donations were the churches with €1,178 million (23%), fol-
lowed by sports and recreation (18%), culture (12%), health (11%).  
5 There is no reliable data on the amount of funds raised by these private initiatives in general, nor 
after the tsunami. It is to be expected that some of them managed to raise substantial amounts af-
ter the tsunami (amounting to a few million euros), while others did not manage to raise much 
more than a few thousand euros.  
